[NYTr] Chile and Venezuela: Myths and Realities of the Arms Race

[nytr at olm.blythe-systems.com]

Americas Program, Center for International Policy - Jul 24, 2007
http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4416


Chile and Venezuela: Myths and Realities of the Arms Race

by Raúl Zibechi 
English translation by Annette Ramos

The recent trip by President Hugo Chávez to Russia has been seen as
part of the arms race in which the Bolivarian leader is engaged.
However, facts indicate that Venezuela is far behind Washington's two
main allies in the region, Colombia and Chile, in the purchase of
weapons.

Although Venezuela garners the headlines, as it turns out it is not the
country at the forefront when it comes to acquiring armaments. In
recent years Chile has purchased weapons valued at US$2.785 billion,
Venezuela at US$2.200 billion, and Brazil, greatly lagging, occupies
third place at US$1.342 billion. A recent report in the industry
magazine Military Power Review affirms that the trans-Andean country
has risen from fourth to third place in the "military capacity" ranking
for South America, displacing Argentina from that position and
approaching Peru, which continues to occupy second place.

Venezuela also rose one place, but continues to lag a considerable
distance behind the most powerful countries militarily. Taking into
account Defense spending as a percentage of Gross National Product
(GNP), Chile takes first place as well, with 3.8% in 2005, followed by
Colombia with 3.7%, a country which also benefited from a large amount
of military aid from the United Status that amounts to US$3 billion
since 2001 due to Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota. In 2005 Venezuela
was still behind, with 1.6% of GNP in military expenditures, very
similar to the percentage in the country before the arrival of Hugo
Chávez's government. Arms and Copper

There is a permanent rise in the price of copper, parallel to that of
petroleum, which increased by 400% between 2002 and 2006 in the
international market. This explains to a large degree what the
Instituto Nueva Mayoría in Argentina assesses as a "steady but gradual
process" of rearming in the last 15 years, accelerated since 2003. In
its report "Rearming: The Paradigmatic Cases of Chile and Venezuela and
Their Regional Impact," the above mentioned think tank maintains that
the Chilean Defense Ministry retains a large degree of autonomy when it
comes to formulating its policies thanks to the Secret Copper Law that
earmarks a certain percentage of the exports of the metal to the armed
forces.

The Chilean military reduced its personnel in the last decade from
120,000 to 40,000, and it reorganized and created eight brigades,
giving priority to mobility and fire power. Chile acquired 100 German
Leonard II heavy tanks, retaining the ability to acquire several more,
and 28 F-16 airplanes equipped with AMRAAN missiles and air-air laser
bombs, unknown until now in the region. Of even larger impact is its
purchase of two modern Scorpene Franco-German submarines as well as
eight missile frigates, maritime patrol airplanes, and oil tankers.
"Media experts have concluded that taking into account the relative
sizes of Brazil and Chile's GNP, the latter spends six times more
economic resources on military equipment than the main power in the
region," says Nueva Mayoría.

Venezuela Defends Itself

While Chile maintains excellent relations with the United States, its
main provider of sophisticated weaponry reserved only for allies, since
2006 Caracas has withstood an embargo by the superpower in military
weapons, equipment, and spares parts. Israel and Sweden could join this
boycott. Since the May 2006 naval maneuvers carried out in the
Caribbean by the United States, Holland, and Great Britain, alarms went
off in Chávez's country because they were the largest undertaken in the
region since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In August of that same
year it became known that the U.S. National Intelligence Agency had
created a special post for specific intelligence and operations tasks
for Cuba and Venezuela.

As of that time Caracas began purchasing weapons, but it had to resort
to countries that do not have good relations with Washington, among
them Russia, China, and Iran, although also Spain. Already more than
52,000 AK-103 machine guns have been delivered of the 100,000 bought
from Russia to replace Belgian FALs dating back to the 1950s. It also
seeks to buy anti-air M1 Tor missiles (similar to the ones just
acquired by Iran), 24 SU-30 jetfighters, 30 transport and attack Mi-35
helicopters, all from Russia, and half a dozen Military Corvettes and a
dozen Spanish transport airplanes.

Until now Venezuela has spent US$3 billion in weapons and now there is
speculation that it could acquire between five and nine conventional
submarines (diesel-electric). According to military analysts, despite
the fact that the submarines are not of the latest generation, they
"constitute a potential threat to any naval or amphibious operation,"
as shown by the Falkland Islands War, when a single, old Argentine
submarine created enormous difficulties for the British forces.

Although it doesn't amount to talk about a regional arms race, the
truth is that Chávez appears to be developing a defense strategy. From
the Iraq experience he has learned the importance of armed militias in
the development of an asymmetric war in the face of a possible
invasion. That explains the massive purchase of machine guns, which he
might be in the position of manufacturing if negotiations to erect a
plant in Venezuela come to fruition. At the same time, if he chooses to
buy the submarines he might be indicating that the country may be
preparing itself for an eventual blockade by sea that could disrupt
petroleum exports.

In any case, it is best to take the above facts with a grain of salt.
Venezuela depends as much on petroleum exports as the United Status
depends on imports from that country. Imports of Venezuelan crude
increased from US$15.2 billion in 2001 to US$34 billion in 2005.
Venezuela is already the third largest exporter of petroleum to the
United States, having displaced Saudi Arabia from that position.

[Raúl Zibechi is a member of the Editorial Board of the weekly Brecha in
Montevideo, Uruguay, a professor and researcher on social movements at
the Multiversidad Franciscana de América Latina, and adviser to several
social groups. He is a monthly contributor to the Americas
Program.(www.americaspolicy.org).]

For More Information:

Instituto Nueva Mayoría
http://www.nuevamayoria.com

Military Review
http://www.militaryreview.army.mil