[NYTr] Slandering Zimbabwe's Fight for Independence

[All the News That Doesn't Fit]

What's Left - July 30, 2007
http://gowans.wordpress.com/2007/07/30/slandering-zimbabwe%e2%80%99s-fight-for-independence/

Slandering Zimbabwe's Fight for Independence

By Stephen Gowans

Zimbabwe is in the grips on an economic crisis. Food and electricity
shortages plague the country, but because Zimbabwe is singled out in the
Western media for special attention, it seems as if its problems are
unique, not part of a wider pattern of scarcity in sub-Saharan Africa,
but the product of the misguided policies of the Mugabe government.
There's a message in the Western media spin on Zimbabwe: reclaiming
land and working to put the economy into hands of nationals leads to
economic meltdown. It's best to leave historical patterns of domination
alone, and to adapt to the prevailing balance of power.

In a July 28, 2007 article on the regrettable state of Zimbabwe's
economy, The Washington Post points out that "daily power outages are
forcing Zimbabweans to light fires to cook and to heat water." Wood
poachers have stripped nearly 500 acres of conservation woodland.

But what the Post doesn't point out is that it's not only Zimbabweans,
but people throughout sub-Saharan Africa, who are stripping forests
bare to provide heat and cooking fuel. (1)

The reason why is rolling power blackouts. "Perhaps 25 of 44 sub-Saharan
nations face crippling electricity shortages." (2) Drought, climbing oil
prices, and the chaos caused by privatization of formerly state-owned
power companies have created an "unprecedented" power crisis that not
only affects Zimbabwe, but Zambia, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda and Togo.

Even South Africa was hit by rolling blackouts in January and sporadic
power failures continue to bedevil the country.

Yet, as a mark of how the Western media frame their reporting to
discredit Zimbabwe, it is in Zimbabwe alone that the electricity
shortages are attributed to the policies of the government.

Zimbabwe's "power, water, health and communications systems are
collapsing," the Post notes, "and there are acute shortages of staple
foods and gasoline." The newspaper points to critics who say economic
mismanagement and Harare's land reform policies are to blame.

But acute food and gasoline shortages are common to neighboring
countries. If Zimbabwe is short of gasoline, "Uganda's gas stations
are.short of diesel for vehicles." (3) If there are shortages of food
staples in Zimbabwe, there are close to two dozen other countries in
sub-Saharan Africa that are contending with food scarcity, according to
the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization.

Since neighbouring countries have not pursued Zimbabwe's fast track land
reform policies, and have tended to shy away from the economic
indigenization policies Harare favors, gasoline, electricity and food
shortages can hardly be attributed to policies uniquely pursued by
Harare. The aim of the media's propaganda is clear: to discredit the
Mugabe government's economic independence policies by suggesting they
are to blame for the country's economic difficulties.

Unlike other sub-Saharan countries, Zimbabwe is a target of economic
sanctions, which have made the region-wide drought and
oil-price-rise-induced crises more acute. The sanctions, imposed by the
US and EU, deny Zimbabwe access to international development aid. NGOs,
following the Western governments that provide their funding, have also
cut off assistance, amplifying the sanctions' effects.

Are the sanctions justified?

The West's opposition to Zimbabwe began in the mid-90s, when the Mugabe
government failed to undertake pro-foreign investor (often called
neo-liberal) economic reforms as quickly as the International Monetary
Fund prescribed.

The IMF expected Zimbabwe to pare back government social spending,
reduce the size of the civil service, devalue its currency, and move
strongly toward an export-oriented economy - measures that would benefit
international investors but would increase the hardships Zimbabweans
already faced.

The IMF also insisted that Zimbabwe pay full market value for the land
it sought to acquire as part of its program to resettle the rural poor
- land that had been stripped from indigenous Africans by European
settlers.

Zimbabwe had received assurances in 1979 from the Thatcher government
that Britain would fund the purchase of land from white settlers, but
the Blair government reneged, proposing instead that it lend Zimbabwe
money in return for Harare enacting policies to enhance investor
confidence (i.e., policies to increase the profits foreign investors
could extract from Zimbabwe.) Since this would amount to taking on new
debt to buy back what had been stolen in the first place, the offer was
refused. Farmland was reclaimed without compensation (except for
improvements the European settlers had made.) The expropriated farmers
were told to seek compensation from London.

By 1997, Harare was in open revolt. IMF-prescribed programs the
government deemed to be injurious to Zimbabweans were rejected and the
IMF's prohibitions on pursuing economically nationalist policies were
ignored. Mugabe announced new tariffs to protect domestic businesses
from foreign competition and introduced an affirmative action program
that differentially benefited domestic firms at the expense of foreign
investors. Western governments, ever vigilant about promoting the
export and foreign investment interests of their own corporations, saw
red.

By 1998, the EU had had enough. Mugabe's land reform program - and now,
the military aid Harare was providing to the young government of
Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo - bid that steps be
taken to force the independence-minded Mugabe out. Kabila, who the US
and Britain were trying to overthrow, was following economically
nationalist policies reminiscent of those of Patrice Lumumba, who the
West had deposed in a CIA-sponsored coup decades earlier. Washington
and London recruited Uganda and Rwanda as proxies to invade the DR
Congo, but their plans were frustrated when Zimbabwe intervened
militarily on the side of the Kabila government. To counter Mugabe, the
EU set out to build civil society -- the unions and NGOs -- as opposite
poles of attraction to Mugabe's government of national liberation.

Soon, Morgan Tsvangirai, head of the Zimbabwe Trades Union Congress,
emerged as leader of a new political party, the Movement for Democratic
Change. The white commercial farmers abandoned their old party, the
Rhodesian Front, and lined up behind their new vehicle, the MDC. With a
war chest filled with generous funding from Western governments and
corporations, the MDC was to lead the opposition to the Mugabe
government from within Zimbabwe.

By 2001, the Sunday Times was urging London to spearhead a worldwide
economic boycott of Zimbabwe. "Until decisive action is taken," the
newspaper warned, "the whole region is a high-risk area for
investment." (4)

The same year, the US enacted the US Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act. The arch-conservative Jesse Helms was a co-sponsor, along
with Hilary Clinton. The act obligates US officials to vote against
assistance to Zimbabwe at the IMF and World Bank; allows the president
to fund groups and individuals working to overthrow the Mugabe
government; and makes respect for the rule of law (i.e., reversal of
Zimbabwe's land reform program) a condition of ending sanctions. US
Representative Cynthia McKinney asked legislators what law European
settlers had respected when they seized the land by force.

Sanctions have one aim: to make the lives of Zimbabweans miserable so
they'll oust Mugabe. The MDC, which supports the sanctions, and is
indefatigable in calling for additional punishments, uses the economic
hardships sanctions have aggravated to call for Mugabe's departure.

Mugabe's program has always been one of independence. As a leader of the
guerrilla movement that fought for national liberation, the goal was an
end to Rhodesian apartheid. As leader of the government, the goal since
the mid 90s has been economic independence; to be secured, first, by
reclaiming the land the indigenous population had been dispossessed of
by European settlers; and second, by putting the economy in the hands
of Zimbabweans as owners, not just employees.

The inevitable consequence of this project has been the backlash of
foreign corporations, Western investors and their governments.

While the Western media would have you believe Zimbabweans are champing
at the bit to oust Mugabe, the reality is that Mugabe is widely
supported, not only in Zimbabwe, but throughout Africa. His credentials
as the leader of a national liberation movement have established his
reputation, his land reform policies have strengthened his support
among the rural poor (who make up the majority of Zimbabweans) and his
insistence on pursuing an independent foreign policy have made him a
rallying point for anti-imperialist sentiment in Africa. As recently as
August 2004, Mugabe was voted number three in the New African
magazine's poll of the 100 greatest Africans (behind Nelson Mandela and
Ghana Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of post-colonial Ghana.) One
of Mugabe's most vehement critics, Archbishop Pious Ncube, grudgingly
acknowledges his popularity. "The United Nations should take (Mugabe)
out but that will not happen because Africa supports Mugabe." (5)

It is fashionable in some circles to profess admiration for Mugabe, as
the leader of the armed national liberation struggle, while denouncing
Mugabe, the politician. Mugabe once fought for national liberation,
it's said, but as a politician, he simply clings to power for power's
sake. Power has corrupted him.

This is the typical screed against the leaders of all really-existing
movements that seek to end the oppression of class or nations. They are
invariably accused of demagogy and corruption and of betraying their
movement's goals. The revolution betrayed is the constant theme. The
purpose of these accusations is to breed cynicism, disillusionment and
ultimately pessimism, passivity and capitulation. It's all in vain, the
detractors say. You'll simply end up with something worse than you
started with. Your movement will be hijacked by authoritarian strongmen
who utter leftist-sounding phrases while enriching themselves and their
cronies.

The goal Mugabe has pursued, whether in the armed struggle or in
government, has never changed: independence. Placing the economy in the
hands of Zimbabweans, as Mugabe is working to do now, is just as much -
indeed, is even more significantly a part - of national liberation as
achieving nominal political independence is. Zimbabweans got their own
flag in 1980, their land after 2000, and now are working to secure
control of their mines and businesses. To say, then, that Mugabe was
true to the goals of national liberation once, but is no longer,
reveals either a miscomprehension of the centrality of land reform and
indigenization to national liberation, a surrender to the barrage of
propaganda against Zimbabwe's national liberation movement, or an
absent commitment to true national liberation.

End Notes

(1) New York Times, July 29, 2007.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Cited in Rob Gowland, "Zimbabwe: The Struggle for Land, the
Struggle for Independence," November, 2002.
http://www.cpa.org.au/booklets/zimbabwe.pdf 

(5) Cited in The Sunday Mail, July 28, 2007.
http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/index.aspx