[NYTr] Sudan - Darfur crisis blanks out many unresolved conflicts

[All the News That Doesn't Fit]

sent by Steven Robinson (activ-l)

The East African - Aug 6, 2007
http://www.nationmedia.com/eastafrican/current/News/news0608074.htm

Darfur crisis blanks out many unresolved conflicts

By Zachary Ochieng
Special Correspondent

Despite the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, many
conflicts - less acute than the Darfur crisis - remain unresolved.

These conflicts have a similar root cause - poor governance and a belief
that the central government does not act on behalf of or represent the
interests of these areas.

However, implementation of the CPA's provisions on reforming the
national government would go a long way towards addressing the common
causes of conflict. Most importantly, the 2009 national elections offer
a peaceful mechanism for aggrieved communities.

The far north is on the verge of explosion because of dams the
government is building at the expense of local communities while in the
east, the Eastern Front rebels have splintered badly thereby affecting
the implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) that was
signed in October 2006.

Kordofan too, faces a number of conflicts as the Misseriya are
increasingly unhappy with the NCP, and thousands have joined the SPLA.
In fact, a new movement with an agenda for more local development, the
Kordofan Alliance for Development (KAD), is threatening to take up
arms. There is risk of both areas joining elements of the rebellion in
Darfur.

Also in trouble is the agreement on Southern Kordofan, where there is a
dangerous rise in clashes between Nuba and nomadic groups. Renewed
conflict in either Blue Nile or Southern Kordofan is to spread quickly
to the other areas.

Admittedly, the Darfur conflict challenges the CPA on many levels. The
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) rebel group received military and political
support from the SPLA/M in 2003-2004, and some SLA leaders had hoped to
be included in the Naivasha negotiations.

The SPLM sought to open another front in Darfur in order to increase
pressure on the NCP to negotiate in good faith, a strategy that spun
out of control and was overtaken by a local, Darfurian agenda.

The international community kept the focus of the Naivasha talks on the
north-south conflict, rather than broadening participation. There was
optimism at the time that the SPLM's entry into government and Dr John
Garang's appointment to the presidency would help resolve Darfur and
other regional conflicts. This did not happen, partly due to Dr
Garang's death and the SPLM's limited attention to national issues, but
more importantly because of NCP decisions.

The NCP hoped it could quickly resolve the Darfur situation by military
means, without having to resort to the kind of power-sharing and
wealth-sharing deal it was making with the South. As the crisis
worsened and international attention grew, it became clear that the
Government of National Unity would have to make a deal with the Darfur
movements.

One of the challenges for it and the African Union mediators then
became how to negotiate a settlement that would satisfy Darfur's
demands for a greater slice of power without upsetting the delicate
balance the SPLM and NCP had negotiated in the CPA.

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), signed in May 2006, was the result of
those negotiations. Rejected by two of the rebel movements and with weak
power-sharing arrangements, inadequate compensation provisions and
unimplemented security arrangements, the DPA has not moved the region
towards peace. Instead, the rebel movements have fragmented, violence
has increased, and even greater numbers of civilians have been
displaced.

The movements have also increased their demands, with many seeking the
same semi-autonomy won by the South.

A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) says that resolving the
conflict requires the international community to urgently focus on
reviving the political track. Since the DPA was signed, efforts have
focused almost exclusively on deployment of first a UN force and then
the AU/UN hybrid force, at the expense of political negotiations. It is
argued that a common international approach, particularly between the
US and China, is necessary for substantial progress.

The ICG has called on the joint AU/UN mediation team to pursue three
prerequisites for peace ahead of a resumption of talks: prioritising
unification of the rebel movements; broadening participation in
negotiations by creating a reference group from key Darfur
constituencies, including Arab groups, internally displaced person
(IDP) communities, civil society and women; and strengthening the
negotiating structures.

There has been some progress on both the political and peacekeeping
fronts since early May 2007, but the general prognosis remains grim.

Despite AU and UN optimism, there is every reason to expect the regime
will continue to delay the actual deployment of a hybrid force. The NCP
seeks to avoid political and security challenges by keeping the
peacekeeping mission weak, underfunded, and frustrated. A more powerful
and effective force might be able to help stabilise Darfur and create
political space for its residents to unite behind a platform that would
challenge the NCP in the 2009 elections.

A stable Darfur with an enforced ceasefire would also facilitate
investigations into crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC),
something the regime also seeks to avoid.

A new threat is rapidly emerging in two areas of northern Sudan where
the government is building hydroelectric dams that will displace local
communities. The older project, the Merowe dam along the fourth
cataract of the Nile, begun in 2003 and due to become operational as
early as 2008, is to be the second largest in Africa and significantly
boost national energy production. It has been hotly contested by the
Manassir and, to a lesser degree, the neighbouring Amri and Hamadab.
All three communities will lose their traditional homelands but are
being denied access by the government to the new waterfront land.

Numerous negotiations have failed to address adequately their demands
for resettlement and compensation, leading to tension and clashes in
which civilians have been killed and arrested by security forces.

The second project is further north, around Kajbar, and threatens to
submerge parts of the ancient Nubian homeland, much of which was already
lost when Egypt completed the Aswan High Dam in 1964. It faces near
unanimous opposition from the Nubian community.

Originally proposed in 1995 then cancelled in 1999, it was revived in
early 2007. There have already been several violent clashes between
Nubians and the government, and the risk of more is very real. A civil
society activist alleged that the grid planned for the Kajbar dam is to
send power directly to the Shaygiya homeland south of Kajbar and west
of Merowe.

A recent report by the UN Environment Programme (Unep) said only a
limited environmental impact assessment had been done for the Merowe
dam, which was authorised more than two years after construction
started.

Unep also argued that, as envisioned, Merowe's negative effects for the
region would include riverbank erosion, reduced river valley groundwater
recharge, blockage of fish migrations and, possibly, damaged downstream
agriculture.

Negotiations around the Merowe dam have gone on for several years,
producing agreements for compensation and resettlement of a small part
of the communities in model villages. Yet, after visiting desert
resettlement sites away from the waterline, the Manassir have largely
rejected the model villages and compensation, claiming broken promises.

The government's lack of transparency and heavy-handed approach fuel
conspiracy theories among Nubians that - even if unproven - could lead
to more conflict.

The first is that the dams are part of a deal for Egypt's support on
Darfur. They argue that since the Aswan High Dam is clogged by
sediment, a solution would be to build feeder dams to filter the silt -
Merowe, Kajbar and Dal are to serve this purpose.

Some Nubian activists fear Kajbar is part of a larger effort by the two
governments to eradicate their traditional culture and Arabise the
region - an NCP goal in other parts of the country in earlier years -
and that the land the dams create will be settled by Egyptian farmers.
Under the "four freedoms" agreement signed in 2004, Egyptians are
entitled to live, work and own property in Sudan.

The second theory relates the dams to a leaked paper by former national
finance minister Abdel Raheem Hamdi, which suggests that the government
prioritise development within the triangle known as the
Dongola-Sinar-Kordofan axis, in central Sudan. It argues that this area
is more harmonious than the rest of the country and open to the idea of
an Arab, Islamic Sudan and calls on the NCP to facilitate political
alliances accordingly. The area can develop economic ties with Darfur
at any time, it argues, but can also continue as a viable state if the
south decides to separate or Darfur is lost.

Urgent action is also required in Kordofan and the east, where the risk
of a renewed conflict is steadily increasing. Divergent trends are
playing out in greater Kordofan, both of which raise the risk of
fighting but are receiving minimal attention from UNMIS and other
international players.

The CPA's shortcoming is its treatment of Southern Kordofan and Blue
Nile states, areas that fought beside the SPLA during the war but were
separated from the south during negotiations and received agreements
that did not satisfy their demands. Implementation is far behind
schedule.

Eastern Sudan also bears close attention. There was no implementation
of the October 2006 agreement that formally ended the conflict with the
Eastern Front until recently.

Whereas there is no immediate risk of renewed fighting, more
international attention is needed to guard against a slow return to
war. As in Sudan's other conflict zones, the fundamental issues of
exclusive governance that have fuelled bloodshed in the east can be
significantly addressed through the national reforms set out in the CPA.