[NYTr] Bush's "Killing Fields" and the Real Lesson of Vietnam

[All the News That Doesn't Fit]

sent by Dave Muller (southnews)

George Bush's invocation of the "killing fields" in Cambodia to try to 
bolster his failing argument for an indefinite continuation of the Iraq 
occupation was a reference to the extreme right's decades-old rant that 
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam caused the bloodbath in Pol Pot's Cambodia.

The Huffington Post - Aug 23, 2007
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-gareth-porter/bushs-killing-fields-a_b_61577.html

Bush's "Killing Fields" and the Real Lesson of Vietnam

by Gareth Porter

George Bush's invocation of the "killing fields" in Cambodia to try to 
bolster his failing argument for an indefinite continuation of the Iraq 
occupation was a reference to the extreme right's decades-old rant that 
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam caused the bloodbath in Pol Pot's Cambodia.

That argument makes a hash of the history of the Vietnam era, but maybe 
it's a good thing that he has brought it up now. The media and the 
blogosphere need to go back over how the killing fields actually came 
about. The fact is, more than three decades after the end of the U.S. 
military involvement in Indochina, there has still not been a real 
debate about the relationship between U.S. policy in Vietnam and the 
human consequences for Cambodia.

The heavy-breathing right-wing crowd has long blamed the anti-war 
movement, Congress and anyone else who supported the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Vietnam for the unnumbered dead in Cambodia under the Khmer 
Rouge regime. That argument has been used as an ideological cudgel to 
keep intellectuals and the media in line, so the next time the United 
States goes to war and it turns sour, they would be afraid to demand an 
end to it. Now it's time to drive a stake through it once and for all.

What Bush and his extreme right-wing allies don't want Americans to 
remember is that it was the American war in Vietnam that made the Khmer 
Rouge such an irresistible power in Cambodia. Before the U.S. ground 
troops poured into Vietnam in 1965, there was no armed struggle by the 
Cambodian Communist movement. It was only because of the spillover of 
the U.S. war between 1965 and 1969 that they were given the opportunity 
to contest for power.

U.S. B-52 attacks and ground operations against the Viet Cong base
areas in South Vietnam pushed the Viet Cong troops across the border
into the jungles of Eastern Cambodia. That, in turn, destabilized
Cambodia's economy, as the Viet Cong troops purchased an estimated 40
Cambodia's rice exports on the black market. That in turn led the
Cambodian military to use force to get rice from peasants at
artificially low prices. The Communists in Cambodia quickly took
advantage of that situation to launch an armed uprising.

Even after four years of war in Vietnam, however, the Khmer Rouge were 
far from being able to contest for national power in Cambodia. In 1970, 
they had an estimated 2,400 to 4,000 guerrillas, few of whom had modern 
weapons.

This is where the story is full of bitter irony. Had Richard Nixon 
chosen to negotiate a quick end to the war, the Vietnamese troops would 
have left Cambodia, Sihanouk probably would have remained in power and 
Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge would probably have remained a footnote to 
history. Instead, however, Nixon opted for four more years of war, and 
in order to gain time politically, he invoked the threat of a 
"bloodbath" in Vietnam if the United States were to withdraw
prematurely.

That was a completely phony issue for which Nixon and Kissinger did not 
have a shred of evidence. But Nixon's decision against peace in Vietnam 
set in motion another new dynamic that made the postwar massacre in 
Cambodia inevitable.

When Sihanouk's right-wing opponents ousted him from power in March 
1970, it may or may not have been with the explicit encouragement of
the Nixon administration. The full story has yet to be written on that 
question. But Nixon did nothing to try to reverse a process that could 
only result in Cambodia being completely engulfed in war.

After just two years of extremely heavy bombing by the United States of 
the vast Khmer Rouge zone of Cambodia, that movement had exploded to 
some 50,000 troops and was able to go on the offensive. By then,
nothing except a massive number of U.S. ground troops in Cambodia
indefinitely could have stopped the Khmer Rouge victory.

It was the Nixon's geographical escalation of the Vietnam War itself -- 
not of the success of the antiwar movement or Congressional fatigue
with war - that produced that outcome.

So the real lesson of the Vietnam-Cambodia war is that U.S. elective
war is profoundly destabilizing, and that destabilization has a
terrible human cost, which may spread beyond the country where the war
began.

But there is a further lesson from that war. When Nixon began crying 
"bloodbath" in 1969 the Vietnam War was already four years old. It was 
his fateful decision to continue and escalate that war that brought 
about the Cambodian catastrophe. The longer American wars of occupation 
are continued, the worse the human and political consequences.

Now history appears to be repeating itself. Once again, after four
years of war, a president is crying "bloodbath" even as he appears to
be headed toward the geographical escalation of the war. Only this time
the escalation will be far more dangerous than was the escalation into 
Cambodia in 1970.

                          ***

Salon - Aug 24, 2007
http://blogs.salon.com/0002255/2007/08/23.html

IRAQ AND VIETNAM COMPARISON / REFUTING BUSH

As Bush blindly tries to ward off the looming failure of his illegal
war and occupation of Iraq he turns to an analogy with Vietnam which is 
quite ironic in that both wars were illegal acts of pre-emptive 
aggression unsanctioned by international law or world opinion and both 
were built on a foundation of lies and deception.

by Allen L Roland

Isn't it ironic that a President who did everything he could to avoid 
the Vietnam war, even to the extent of going AWOL from his Air Force 
unit in the last year of his reserve duty, is now attempting to use 
Vietnam as his self serving crutch in attempting to justify the 
catastrophic failure of his illegal war and occupation of Iraq ~ 
ignoring the fact that both wars were illegal acts of pre-emptive 
aggression unsanctioned by international law or world opinion and both 
were built on a foundation of lies and deception.

The Progressive Review lists the things Iraq and Vietnam have in common 
but what is not mentioned is the incredible loss of innocent human 
beings in each conflict and the 60,000 names ingraved in black marble
on the Vietnam Memorial ~ which are lasting reminders of the true human 
cost of our blind arrogance and hubris:

                                *

 Media Channel 
 http://www.mediachannel.org/views/dissector/affalert366.shtml

THINGS IRAQ AND VIETNAM HAVE IN COMMON

by Danny Schecter

1. Both wars were illegal acts of pre-emptive aggression unsanctioned
by international law or world opinion.

2. Both wars were launched with deception. In Iraq it was the now
proven phony WMD threat and contrived Saddam-Osama connection. In
Vietnam, it was the fabricated Gulf of Tonkin incident and the
elections mandated by the Geneva agreement that were canceled by
Washington in l956 when the U.S. feared Ho Chi Minh would win .

3. The government lied regularly in both wars. Back then, the lies were 
pronounced a "credibility gap." Today, they are considered acceptable 
"information warfare." In Saigon military briefers conducted
discredited "5 O'Clock Follies" press conferences. In this war, the
Pentagon spoon-fed info at a Hollywood style briefing center in Doha.

4. The U.S. press was initially an enthusiastic cheerleader in both 
wars. When Vietnam protest grew and the war seen as a lost cause, the 
media frame changed. In Iraq today most of the media is trapped in
hotel rooms. Only one side is covered now whereas in Vietnam, there was
more reporting occasionally from the other. In Vietnam, the accent was
on progress and "turned corners." The same is true in Iraq.

5. In both wars, prisoners were abused...

6. Illegal weapons were "deployed" in both wars. The U.S. dropped 
napalm, used cluster bombs against civilians and sprayed toxic Agent 
Orange in Vietnam. Cluster bombs and updated Mark 77 napalm-like 
firebombs were dropped on Iraqis. Depleted uranium was added to the 
arsenal of prohibited weapons in Iraq.

7. Both wars claimed to be about promoting democracy. Vietnam staged 
elections and saw a succession of governments controlled by the U.S. 
come and go. Iraq has had one election so far in which most voters say 
they were casting ballots primarily to get the U.S. to leave. The U.S. 
has stage-managed Iraq's interim government. Exiles were brought back 
and put in power. Vietnam's Diem came from New Jersey, Iraq's Allawi 
from Britain.

8. Both wars claimed to be about noble international goals. Vietnam was 
pictured as a crusade against aggressive communism and falling dominos. 
Iraq was sold as a front in a global war on terrorism. Neither claim 
proved true.

9. An imperial drive for resource control and markets helped drive both 
interventions. Vietnam had rubber and manganese and rare minerals. Iraq 
has oil. In both wars, any economic agenda was officially denied and 
ignored by most media outlets.

10. Both wars took place in countries with cultures we never understood 
or spoke the language. Both involved "insurgents" whose military
prowess was underestimated and misrepresented. In Vietnam, we called
the "enemy" communists; in Iraq we call them foreign terrorists.
(Soldiers had their own terms, "gooks" in Vietnam, "ragheads" in Iraq)
In both counties, there was in fact an indigenous resistance that
enjoyed popular support. (Both targeted and brutalized people they
considered collaborators with the invaders just as our own Revolution
went after Americans who backed the British.) In both wars, as in all
wars, innocent civilians died in droves.

11. In both countries the U.S. promised to help rebuild the damages 
caused by U.S. bombing. In Vietnam, a $2 Billion presidential 
reconstruction pledge was not honored. In Iraq, the electricity and 
other services are still out in many areas. In both wars U.S. companies 
and suppliers have profited handsomely; Brown &Root in Vietnam; 
Halliburton in Iraq, to cite but two.

12. In Vietnam, the Pentagon's counter-insurgency effort failed to 
"pacify" the countryside even with a half a million U.S. soldiers "in 
country." The insurgency in Iraq is growing despite the best efforts of 
U.S. soldiers. More have died since President Bush proclaimed "mission 
accomplished" than during the invasion. The insurgency in Iraq is 
growing despite the best efforts of U.S. soldiers.

The Vietnamese forced the U.S. into negotiations for the Paris Peace 
Agreement. When the agreement was continually violated, they
brilliantly staged a final offensive that surprised and routed a
superior million-man Saigon Army. Can the Iraqi resistance do the same?

                                  *

( The answer is yes and they probably will if we continue to ignore the 
first Law of Holes ~ Stop Digging ) ALR

[Allen L Roland is a practicing psychotherapist, author and lecturer
who also shares a daily political and social commentary on his weblog
and website allenroland.com He also guest hosts a monthly national
radio show TRUTHTALK on www.conscioustalk.net]

[end of Dave Muller's post]


                                ***

[And a neoliberal Clintonian view...]


The Huffington Post - Aug 23, 2007
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-gareth-porter/bushs-killing-fields-a_b_61577.html

Avoiding the Killing Fields II

by Suzanne Nossel

As the calls for US withdrawal from Iraq grow ever louder, both boosters
and opponents of American disengagement are kept up at night by a common
fear: that the departure of American troops will eliminate the one thing
standing in the way of Iraq's descent into chaos and slaughter of a
magnitude that could make the last few years look calm by comparison.

Some Iraqi politicians argue passionately that as bad as things are in
their country, they would be far worse without the Americans on patrol.

Even those who want the US military out acknowledge grave risks to the
human rights, security and welfare of the Iraqi population after
withdrawal. Presidential candidate John Edwards is among the most
outspoken in the 2008 race about the need for pullback on a tight
timetable, but he too calls for a "plan" to prevent genocide after the
US goes.

The prospect of even wider ethnic killings, terrorist attacks, and
abuses of civilians by militias and insurgents is of grave concern no
matter where you sit. For the Bush Administration and other proponents
of the war, the idea that the Iraq adventure could end in mass
slaughter is the ultimate indictment of their flawed policies. For
opponents of the war who decry the bloodshed and disruption that it has
caused, a stance that culminates in untrammeled civilian killings and
human rights abuses is unconscionable.

For those mindful of international norms, a deterioration in conditions
in Iraq would implicate the UN's newly-minted "responsibility to
protect" a global doctrine that mandates that the world not stand by in
the face of genocide or mass atrocities that a national government is
unwilling or unable to stop. For Arab opinion-leaders and publics who
protested the invasion and occupation of Iraq, concerns for both the
wellbeing of the Iraqi people and the stability of the wider region are
implicated. Given the growing inevitability of US (and UK) withdrawal,
what are the realistic prospects for preventing an onslaught on
civilians? At least six possibilities are on the table, none of them
close to satisfactory:

- First is the notion, seeming to become more far-fetched by the day,
that the Iraqi armed forces will take control of their country, protect
the public, and tamp down the militias. But Iraq's security forces are
infiltrated with sectarian partisans and still heavily dependent on the
US. If the Administration thought they could forestall chaos without US
involvement, withdrawal would have happened already.

- A second avenue is the proposal of a negotiated partition of Iraq to
provide for a peaceful divide along sectarian lines, preempting more
violent ethnic cleansing. But the mechanics of partition are complex and
contested, and a majority of Iraqis polled say they oppose the concept.
The Iraqi population is residentially integrated in many areas, meaning
that partition would require mass dislocations and loss of livelihoods
and property. The idea that political momentum will materialize to
shepherd through detailed agreements and large scale population
transfers necessary to effectuate partition is far-fetched. So is the
notion that the US will somehow effectuate partition without the
negotiated participation of Iraq's population groups.

- A third scenario is that sufficient residual US troops (numbering in
the low tens of thousands) remain in Iraq to forestall large-scale
abuses of civilians. But, depending on the size and mandate of the
presence, this could flys in the face of the idea that one factor
fueling the insurgency is the very presence of US troops. It also seems
implausible given the inability of a much larger force to get Iraq
under control.

- A fourth possibility is that so-called safe havens and civilian
corridors can be created such that even if out-and-out civil war erupts,
the innocent can be temporarily protected and humanitarian aid provided.
It is true that large swaths of Iraqi territory remain peaceful and that
some civilians might willingly go to such areas. But it is unclear how
so-called safe areas would actually be protected if they came under
attack and, even if they were safe, such corridors could represent a
path toward ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Shiite areas.

- A fifth scenario is that US troops withdraw "over the horizon" either
to Kuwait or to offshore vessels so that they are poised to reenter in
the event that conditions sharply deteriorate. This is frankly absurd:
once American troops exit Iraq, they aren't coming back, particularly
if the terrible conditions and hopelessness that prompted their
withdrawal have gotten even worse. Their ability to stop ethnic
cleansing from afar is almost certainly nil.

- A sixth scenario is that an international presence in some way takes
over where the US leaves off, assuming responsibility for protecting the
civilian population and trying to curb the violence. US Ambassador to
the UN (and former envoy to Baghdad) Zalmay Khalilzad is pushing for
greater UN involvement, and Secretary General Ban Ki Moon has said the
organization won't shy away from this role. But the idea that the UN,
with its limited resources, finite mandates, comparatively miniscule
firepower, and cobbled together troops can succeed where the US has
failed seems remote.

While none of these measures, in itself, averts the potential for
genocide, elements of several could be combined into a strategy to at
least lessen the likelihood that US withdrawal leads to catastrophe. The
training of Iraqi troops should place primary emphasize civilian
protection and upholding of human rights irrespective of sectarian and
ethnic lines. While wholesale partition of Iraq is probably infeasible,
the potential should be explored to support the peaceful voluntary
separation of populations already underway in some areas to foster
stability and lessen the danger of violence.

As many proponents of withdrawal acknowledge, some residual force
remaining in Iraq to continue to train troops, root out terrorists and
hopefully deter violence might be in both American and Iraqi interests.
The tiny UN presence in Iraq, if expanded under the right conditions,
may be able to draw on the organization's humanitarian and human rights
expertise to monitor and deter violations, as well as aid needy victims.

This kind of multifaceted approach needs to be formalized into a clear
strategy laying out the role that the Iraqi military and the US will
play in protecting Iraqi's population in a withdrawal scenario. If that
doesn't happen, the after-effects of the US's exit from Iraq could wind
up being even worse than the consequences of its entry.

[Suzanne Nossel is a Senior Fellow at the Security and Peace Institute.
She served as Deputy to the Ambassador for UN Management and Reform at
the US Mission to the United Nations from 1999 – 2001 under Ambassador
Richard C. Holbrooke. There she represented the U.S. in the UN’s
General Assembly negotiating a deal to settle the U.S.’s arrears to the
world body. Prior to that Suzanne served as a Consultant at McKinsey &
Company and as a staff attorney at Children’s Rights Inc. During the
early 1990s Suzanne worked in Johannesburg, South Africa on the
implementation of South Africa’s National Peace Accord, a multi-party
agreement aimed at curbing political violence during that country’s
transition to democracy. Ms. Nossel has done election monitoring and
human rights documentation in Bosnia and Kosovo. She is also the author
of Presumed Equal: What America’s Top Women Lawyers Really Think About
Their Firms (Career Press, 1998).]