[NYTr] Bush Neocons on Pakistan: Neat, Simple, IGNORANT and Dangerously Naive

[All the News That Doesn't Fit]

[We've posted several articles about the nonsensical and ignorant
Amerikan pipedreams regarding Pakistan, as well as some that debunk all
the idiocy. Today's IRC Rightweb article is a good antidote to the crazy
fantasies being spun by fools such as Frederick Kagan and the nut John
Bolton -- the US has been "helping" Pakistan keep its nukes secure; the
US has a plan to take their nukes away and move them to New Mexico; the
US already has control of Pakistan's nukes, etc. etc. It's all chaff.
And it's all published with a straight face by the likes of The New
York Times and The Guardian as if these tales don't contradict
one another and as if they weren't the ravings of lunatics. The
Guardian's latest follows the IRC Rightweb piece below.  Pay no
attention. It's all designed to distract and confuse. - NY Transfer]

IRC Rightweb - Nov 30, 2007 
http://rightweb.irc-online.org/rw/4778


The Neocons on Pakistan: Neat, Simple, and Dangerously Naïve

Analysis by Najum Mushtaq

Just as a flicker of hope emerged to bring back elected civilian rule
to Pakistan, the ideological warriors of neoconservatism are up in arms
to douse it. Having supported Pervez Musharraf as the stalwart general
in America's "war on terror," U.S. neoconservatives are panic-stricken
at the prospect of his political demise. No sooner did he decide to
relinquish his army post to become a civilian president than fear of
Pakistan's collapse and of loose nuclear weapons gripped Musharraf's
backers in the United States. Neoconservative analysts are hatching
plans to raid the country and nick the nukes before it sinks into
chaos. Others, less inclined to use the military option just now, have
come up with puerile analyses of how a "Westernized core" of the
military and Pakistani civil society can be used to thwart the
worst-case scenario of Islamists taking over the country and, with it,
the dreaded weapons.

An exasperated Charles Krauthammer attempts to untie Pakistan's
"tangled knots" and wonders, "What is America to do about Pakistan?" He
mumbles through an ill-informed analysis of a post-General Musharraf
Pakistan, where he says, "Islamic barbarians are at the gates" ("How To
Untie Pakistan's Knots," Redding.com, November 10, 2007). Frederick
Kagan, a leading light at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and
Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, foresee Pakistan's
collapse and propose two fantastic methods of direct military
intervention to secure the country's nuclear arsenal, which should
ideally be shipped to "someplace like New Mexico" ("Pakistan's
Collapse, Our Problem," New York Times, November 18, 2007). SEE:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/opinion/18kagan.html
(Why New Mexico? Because "given the degree to which Pakistani
nationalists cherish these assets, it is unlikely the United States
would get permission to destroy them" in Pakistan.)

And speaking at an AEI forum to launch his new book, Surrender is Not
an Option, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton
described the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal as "the
principal American strategic interest." Conceding that the Pakistani
president "is no Jeffersonian democrat," Bolton insisted: "We should
support Musharraf. His control of the army is most likely to hold the
nuclear arsenal in a secure place" (November 13, 2007).

Three basic assumptions underpin these writers' opinion that Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal is in jeopardy. One, that Pakistan without Musharraf
and the military at the helm is bound to disintegrate and likely to be
taken over by Islamic extremists. Two, that Pakistan's polity consists
of three active factions: the Taliban-like religious zealots, and "the
two most Westernized, most modernizing elements of Pakistani
society—the army ... and the elite of civil society, including lawyers,
jurists, journalists, and students," as Krauthammer puts it, also
asserting that the Taliban "are waiting to pick up the pieces from the
civil war developing between" the last two elements.

The third, equally ill-founded premise of the neocon view of Pakistan
is that military intervention by the United States and its allies would
not only ensure security of the nuclear arsenal, but also help the
military "hold the country's center"—Islamabad and populous areas like
Punjab—in Kagan and O'Hanlon's words.

Let's take these three assumptions one by one and see if these Pakistan
"experts" have any contact with the reality of the country whose future
they would shape. The Myth of Barbarians at the Gates

The argument pushed by Bolton and others that if not for Musharraf and
the military, Pakistan would have fallen into the hands of al-Qaida and
the Taliban, is a beaten, much repudiated idea. Nothing displays the
neocons' ignorance of Pakistani society and politics more clearly than
this drummed-up fear.

Facts point in the opposite direction. It is under military rule like
Musharraf's that militants gain ground and prominence. Whenever the
people of Pakistan have had the opportunity to express their will, they
have voted overwhelmingly for mainstream political parties, and they
are likely to do so again in January 2008, when the next general
elections are scheduled to be held.

Pakistan's religious parties are bitterly divided along sectarian
lines. Furthermore, practitioners of Islam in Pakistan, as indeed
elsewhere in the world, are not a homogenous, monolithic entity. The
Taliban represents a marginal group within a minority Sunni sect. The
clergy of the rest of the Muslim sects are as staunch in their
opposition to the Taliban as they are anti-America. Even when they are
united—as they were under the banner of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
(MMA) in the 2002 elections—they could not bag more than 11% of the
total vote. The electorate has always chosen parties like the Pakistan
People's Party of Benazir Bhutto, the Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif,
and other regional parties—none of whom are religious extremists or
pro-militancy.

It is true that incidents of terrorism and the power of the sharia
movement have increased during the eight years of the Musharraf regime.
But still, religious extremism remains on the fringes of both Pakistani
society and polity. There are pockets of support for the Taliban in the
Pashtun tribal areas, but even there, if and when elections have been
held, traditional tribal elders or moderate (relative to the Taliban)
religious leaders win. The best bet to countering the Taliban and
extremism in general is continued elected civilian rule, not protracted
dictatorship of the generals.

Few other countries have suffered more at the hands of religious
terrorists than Pakistan. Yet, the people have refused to succumb to
the threat. Nor have they been forced into subscribing to the extremist
ideology of al-Qaida. But instead of investing in the democratic
process and waiting for the Muslim electorate of Pakistan to give its
verdict on what kind of government it wants, impatient neoconservatives
are rushing to conclude that without the military in power, the country
will slide into an abyss and fall apart. If Washington wants to see a
stable Pakistan, it must not lose sight of the fact that instability
has grown during Musharraf's rule. More of Musharraf and his generals
would bring more of the same.

Fallacious Faultlines

Another insult to common sense and to Pakistani citizens' intelligence
is Krauthammer's three-way distribution of the country's body politic.
His biased neocon perception sees in Pakistan, on one side, the Taliban
and, on the other, two "Westernized" groups of the military and civil
society. Appearing on Fox News in early November, he stated this
ignorant view: "[T]he catastrophe is that the two Westernized elements
are now attacking each other as the Islamists sit and watch and wait to
either attack or cause chaos or take more terrorism action." Neat and
simple, but also dangerously naïve.

As mentioned above, not all religious parties and Muslim sects are
pro-Taliban. And very few of the so-called core of the military and
elite civil society are Westernized. In fact, calling the military an
agent of Westernization and modernization, as Krauthammer does, is
risible. Has he forgotten the Reagan era Pakistan policy of the United
States? The military had gone through a long process of Islamization
under the previous Republican-sponsored military regime of Gen. Zia
ul-Haq. And the military remains an Islamized institution. Superficial
changes and unpopular policy somersaults by Musharraf have done little
to reduce the impact of that indoctrination. Religion is the main
motivation of the soldiery. In any case, the military's institutional
and corporate interests remain paramount and trump any ideological
consideration, which is why it had first orchestrated an Islamic jihad
in Afghanistan in the 1980s and was then able to do a volte-face under
Musharraf. It is the generals' appetite for power and control over
civil institutions that dictates the military's alignment with the
United States. What the military ought to be doing in the wake of
Musharraf's abdication from his army post is returning to the barracks
under a semblance of subservience to civilian control.

Even among the civil society of journalists, students, lawyers,
politicians, and nongovernmental organizations, Islamic-minded people
are heavily represented. It is, after all, a Muslim-majority country.
To label all the protesting lawyers, journalists, and students under
the heading of "Westernized, modern" segments of society is the
ultimate intellectual lethargy. These Pakistanis' protests against
Musharraf are not motivated by ideals of a Western-like liberalization
or by a desire to see an unbridled wave of modernity. It is the denial
of political freedom, the purging of the judiciary, and the suppression
of freedom of expression that have caused them to retaliate against
Musharraf. To equate that with a movement for Westernization and
modernization is to ignore the diversity within Pakistan's civil
society. There are many more ethnic, sectarian, political, and cultural
fault lines that run through Pakistani society. The best way to manage
that diversity is through democratic means. But those who have
President George W. Bush's ears are itching for military action,
whether by backing Pakistani generals or direct U.S. military
intervention—or both.

Mad Military Methods

The neoconservative position on Pakistan is redolent of the Cold War
times when Washington had supported another military dictator, Zia
ul-Haq. As Krauthammer puts it: "The logic [of backing dictators] was
simple: The available and likely alternative—i.e., communists—would be
worse." Replace communists with terrorists, you have the crux of the
neocon ideology exposed for what it really is: fear-mongering to
conjure up excuses for exhibition of U.S. military power.

Failing to learn from the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, analysts
like Kagan and O'Hanlon would have Washington embroiled in another
potentially catastrophic military mission in Pakistan. "One possible
plan would be a Special Forces operation with the limited goal of
preventing Pakistan's nuclear materials and warheads from getting into
the wrong hands. Somehow, American forces would have to team with
Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly to move the material
to a safer place," suggest Kagan and O'Hanlon.

They also have another alternative: "So, if we got a large number of
troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely directive
would be to help Pakistan's military and security forces hold the
country's center—primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad,
and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south. ...
Pro-American moderates could well win a fight against extremist
sympathizers on their own. But they might need help if splinter forces
or radical Islamists took control of parts of the country containing
crucial nuclear materials. The task of retaking any such regions and
reclaiming custody of any nuclear weapons would be a priority for our
troops."

So fixated are these analysts on a military solution to every problem
that the normal procedures of ensuring nuclear weapons do not even
cross their minds. The answer to these fears is not a military invasion
of Pakistan, which will pitch the entire population and the military
against U.S. forces. What is needed is a better structured, more
transparent, well-codified command and control system. Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal has been under military control; civilian political
leadership, even when in power, has been kept out of the nuclear loop.
This needs to change. The command and control structure can be further
improved by introducing more openness into the process. Whatever
civilian government Pakistan gets after the January 2008 elections, it
should be given a say in managing the country's nuclear assets.

America and the rest of the international community ought to intervene
in Pakistan, but not for the wrong reasons, and certainly not through
military means. President Musharraf and the military must be put under
pressure to ensure genuine, credible elections in January 2008.
Military aid and other perks for military officers such as training,
joint exercises, and academic courses should be made contingent upon
continuity of a democratic process. The new generation of
post-Musharraf generals will have to learn to live under civilian
leaders, despite the flaws of the politicians. Instituting democracy
and a culture of civilian supremacy is a long haul and will take
decades of uninterrupted electoral exercise and peaceful transitions of
power. But the alternative to this, in the name of stability,
antiterrorism, and nuclear safekeeping, would spell disaster for
Pakistan as well as for global security.

[Najum Mushtaq is a project director at the Pak Institute for Peace
Studies and a contributor to IRC's Right Web.]


                                 ***

The Guardian - Dec 1, 2007 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/0,,2220126,00.html

Bush handed blueprint to seize Pakistan's nuclear arsenal

* Architect of Iraq surge draws up takeover options
* US fears army's Islamists might grab weapons

by Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark

The man who devised the Bush administration's Iraq troop surge has
urged the US to consider sending elite troops to Pakistan to seize its
nuclear weapons if the country descends into chaos.

In a series of scenarios drawn up for Pakistan, Frederick Kagan, a
former West Point military historian, has called for the White House to
consider various options for an unstable Pakistan.

These include: sending elite British or US troops to secure nuclear
weapons capable of being transported out of the country and take them
to a secret storage depot in New Mexico or a "remote redoubt" inside
Pakistan; sending US troops to Pakistan's north-western border to fight
the Taliban and al-Qaida; and a US military occupation of the capital
Islamabad, and the provinces of Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan if asked
for assistance by a fractured Pakistan military, so that the US could
shore up President Pervez Musharraf and General Ashfaq Kayani, who
became army chief this week.

"These are scenarios and solutions. They are designed to test our
preparedness. The United States simply could not stand by as a
nuclear-armed Pakistan descended into the abyss," Kagan, who is with
the American Enterprise Institute, a thinktank with strong ideological
ties to the Bush administration, told the Guardian. "We need to think
now about our options in Pakistan,"

Kagan argued that the rise of Sunni extremism in Pakistan, coupled with
the proliferation of al-Qaida bases in the north-west, posed a real
possibility of terrorists staging a coup that would give them access to
a nuclear device. He also noted how sections of Pakistan's military and
intelligence establishment continued to be linked to Islamists and
warned that the army, demoralised by having to fight in Waziristan and
parts of North-West Frontier Province, might retreat from the borders,
leaving a vacuum that would be filled by radicals. Worse, the military
might split, with a radical faction trying to take over Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal.

Kagan accepted that the Pakistani military was not in the grip of
Islamists. "Pakistan's officer corps and ruling elites remain largely
moderate. But then again, Americans felt similarly about the shah's
regime and look what happened in 1979," he said, referring to Iran.

The scenarios received a public airing two weeks ago in an article for
the New York Times by Kagan and Michael O'Hanlon, an analyst at the
Brookings Institution, who has ties to the Democrats.

They have been criticised in the US as well as Pakistan, with Kagan
accused of drawing up plans for another US occupation of a Muslim
country.

But the scenarios are regarded with some seriousness because of Kagan's
influence over thinking in the Bush administration as the architect of
the Iraq troop surge, which is conceded to have brought some
improvements in security.

A former senior state department official who works as a contractor
with the government and is familiar with current planning on Pakistan
told the Guardian: "Governments are supposed to think the unthinkable.
But these ideas, coming as they do from a man of significant influence
in Washington's militarist camp, seem prescriptive and have got tongues
wagging - even in a town like Washington, built on hyperbole."

Kagan said he was not calling for an occupation of Pakistan.

"I have been arguing the opposite. We cannot invade, only work with the
consent of elements of the Pakistan military," he said.

"But we do have to calculate how to quantify and then respond to a
crisis that is potentially as much a threat as Soviet tanks once were.
Pakistan may be the next big test."

The political and security crises there have led the Bush
administration to conclude that Pakistan has become a more dangerous
place than it was before Musharraf took over in the coup of October
1999.

One Pentagon official said last week that the defence department had
indeed been war-gaming some of Kagan's scenarios.

A report by Kagan and O'Hanlon in April highlighted their argument.

"The only serious response to this international environment is to
develop armed forces capable of protecting America's vital interests
throughout this dangerous time," it said.

But in Pakistan, aides to Musharraf yesterday dismissed Kagan's study
as "hyperbole".