[NYTr] Hamdan military trial at Gitmo Gulag
All the News That Doesn't Fit
nytr at blythe-systems.com
Thu Dec 6 01:53:47 EST 2007
sent by MichaelP Dec 5, 2007
[This is a summary piece on the Hamdan case - it's being heard this
very day in GITMO , perhaps at the very time related matters are being
argued in the USSup Ct.
But while we may need to wait the SupCt decision until July,
important things may be decided - even favorably - in today's the
military proceeding. -Michael]
Human Events
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=23811
Justice at GITMO Today
by Roger D. Carstens
For the Hamdan case, it can't GITMO better than this.
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the admitted driver and body guard for Usama Bin
Laden, will face evidence regarding his alleged unlawful status today
at the military detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba . Hamdan's
path from the battlefield -- where he was captured during the
invasion of Afghanistan -- to a courtroom in Gitmo is storied, with
stops at the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States
Congress, and even an appellate court or two.
But today's action may trump them all in importance, as it may very
well turn into the first time in recorded legal history that an
alleged enemy of the United States has his status as a combatant
determined in a judicial proceeding as opposed to an administrative
one.
But before jumping into the events taking place at Gitmo today, we
have to understand what's been happening on the Hamdan case since he
was captured.
Hamdan's first time before a military commission was in November of
2004, but it was cut short when the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia determined that no "competent tribunal" had
decided whether he was a POW or not; and that the military commission
deciding his case had violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). More specifically, the court decided that the President, as
the Commander-in-Chief, did not have the statutory authority to
establish such a tribunal; and that part of the Geneva Conventions
(Common Article 3) applied to all prisoners captured in Afghanistan,
thus almost (but not quite) providing them with Prisoner of War status
(meaning that they had to be treated in a way that differed from how
they were treated under the designation of "Unlawful Enemy
Combatants").
Shortly after, the work of the military commissions was halted.
Later, in July of 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed Hamdan's appeal, stating that the Geneva Convention
did not apply to members of Al Qaida and thus were not judicially
enforceable. The tribunals were also deemed to be legal, but the
reason why is so wrapped up in legalese as to be incomprehensible to
anyone but a lawyer or a man without a social life (uh, that would be
me), so I will spare you. But trust me on this one.
The military commissions were soon back in action. But not for long.
On 7 November 2005, the Supreme Court decided to review the previous
decision regarding Hamdan, and on 29 June 2006 ruled in Hamdan V.
Rumsfeld that military commissions were not in compliance with the
UCMJ and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Basically, the
Supreme Court decided that the President did not have the express
powers beyond those specifically granted to him by the UCMJ to create
these specific military commissions; and that members of Al Qaida were
entitled to some of the Geneva Conventions' protections.
Once again, the military commissions were halted.
Then in October of 2006, the United States Congress decided to act,
passing the bipartisan Military Commissions Act of 2006, which
addressed the Supreme Court's concerns by explicitly authorizing
military commissions and providing them the statutory authority to
conduct trials and prosecute detainees for war crimes.
Commissions: back on. And Hamdan was charged again.
But wait! We are not done yet. Take another sip of coffee and read
on.
Fast forward to June of 2006, when a judge who was to decide the fate
of one of Hamdan's fellow detainees -- the Canadian Omar Khadr --
decided that the commission did not have jurisdiction over Khadr's
case.
As Hamdan's case was next in the docket, his lawyers filed a similar
request, challenging the commission's jurisdiction. Shortly after,
the charges against Hamdan were dismissed.
An appellate court later reversed the decision of Khadr's judge,
stating that as the trial judge, he has inherent authority to
determine for himself whether the commission has proper jurisdiction
over the accused.
(Look - I know this is whole thing is rather taxing. Kind of like an
Agatha Christie "whodunit" novel, but without the part about being
interesting. But hang in there with me. We're almost done).
Following the decision of the appellate court in Khadr, the trial
judge in Hamdan granted the U.S. government's request for
reconsideration of the dismissal of charges against Hamdan. The
motion was granted.
Which brings us back to Hamdan and today's hearing. Going along the
lines of the Khadr case, the judge today will make a determination as
to whether a military commission has the jurisdiction to hear the case
against Hamdan (note: the judge does not decide guilt or innocence;
rather he, as any other judge, acts as a sort of referee to decide
the legal sufficiency of the evidence implicating Hamdan as an
Unlawful Enemy Combatant. A jury of military officers will ultimately
determine Hamdan's guilt or innocence).
So, how will this play out today? Well, for starters, the judge will
ask the defense whether they still want to challenge the jurisdiction
of the court to review this case.
If the defense says, yes, then the judge will ask the prosecution if
they are ready to demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction by
presenting evidence. The defense, in turn, will be asked if they are
ready to present evidence in order to counter the prosecution (note:
the defense COULD say "we are not ready," but that would not bode well
for them, as they have had a lot of time to prepare. It would be akin
to not having a gift for your wife on Christmas morning. And I think
that we all know how that would go down).
If the above happens, it will amount to a "mini trial," where a
damning amount of evidence will be paraded -- for the first time --
before the court and the public probably showing Hamdan to be a very
bad man.
And the defense does not want this. For years now, the court of world
opinion has been solidly against Gitmo, to the point that one might
think that only innocent people caught in the wrong place at the wrong
time reside there. Tapes, film, witness statements proving otherwise
could damage Hamdan's chances later on down the line to accrue
benefits arising from the presumption of innocence in the eyes of the
public opinion, the media, and politicians.
But if the defense elects to have a showdown, things may proceed
quickly, with a possible outcome being the first time in legal history
that an alleged enemy of the United States has his status as a
combatant determined in a judicial proceeding as opposed to an
administrative one.
That said, a more probable outcome for today is that the defense team
-- not wanting to enable the prosecution to drag Hamdan through the
mud -- will tell the judge that they wish to withdrawal the challenge
to the court's jurisdiction at this time (they can -- at a later date
-- review the bidding; but this allows the defense to live to fight
another day).
In the absence of a challenge the appellate decision in Khadr directs
that a properly charged and referred case is presumed to have
jurisdiction.
Hamdan may then choose to enter a plea; however he will most likely
defer entering a plea until a later date.
As a result, a period of "motions and filings" would take place (often
referred to as the "paper battle") where the defense could be expected
to use other delaying tactics, such as challenging the
constitutionality of the court; challenging the constitutionality or
the impartiality of the judges; posing the applicability of the Law of
War; raising the issue of habeas corpus rights -- all in an attempt
to string the legal process out as long as possible.
But why? Because delaying allows for other pressures and court
decisions to perhaps positively influence the outcome of the case.
As the case stretches out to next year, politicians, candidates for
office, the political parties, and perhaps even the President may be
pressured into making a political decision to shut down Gitmo and move
all remaining prisoners to the United States, thus starting up a whole
new round of legal wrangling regarding jurisdiction, habeas rights,
etc.
Additionally, other detainee cases (like Boumediene v. Bush which is
to be brought before the Supreme Court today for oral arguments) may
result in decisions that may impact the ongoing Hamdan case.
Frankly, there are probably other things that could happen -- things
that we cannot predict -- that would result in a more favorable
outcome for Hamdan.
Thus the delaying strategy.
OK: we now have some insight into where Hamdan has been and where it
is going. But what does this mean to you and me? Well, having recently
retired from the military allow me to offer just one that comes
immediately to mind: that precedent will be established that
-- turns battlefields into crime scenes;
-- requires Soldiers to "Mirandize" bad guys ;
-- forces military operations to become legal operations , where
troops in the field will strike an enemy objective and suddenly be
thrust into a world of trial judges, attorneys, crime scene recovery,
discovery .
-- pulls soldiers from the field to testify and defend their actions
in a court, resulting in military units becoming combat ineffective
for the duration of the trial.
Controlling a crime scene is hard enough in a city like Washington,
DC. Imagine having to control a
crime scene in a denied enemy territory.
And allow me to leave you with a final thought. I have visited Gitmo
twice, and have wrestled with detainee issues in places like Kosovo
and Iraq, and I am always left with a feeling of pride as I watch the
professionals of our military legal system work tirelessly to give
ethical and fair treatment to all.
You may disagree and challenge the concept or structure of the
military commissions; you may disagree and challenge recent court and
Congressional decisions regarding Habeas Corpus; you may even disagree
with and challenge the Administration's policies. That is all fair
game.
But please do not challenge the integrity of the men and woman of our
legal system who have taken a Constitutional oath to provide us their
best. We can continue to count on them to do what is right.
[Mr. Carstens is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New
American Security. He recently retired from the Army Special Forces
with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.]
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