[NYTr] Castro Helped Chavez Avert the Failed 2002 Coup

[All the News That Doesn't Fit]

sent by MichaelP

The Nation - Jan 21, 2008 issue
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080121/castro


Castro Helps Chavez Avert a Coup

An Excerpt from "Fidel Castro: My Life" (A Spoken Autobiography)

Introduction by Peter Kornbluh

"I congratulate you on your speech. It was an 'I came, I saw, I
conquered' message of dignity and ethics," Fidel Castro wrote to Hugo
Chavez on December 3, only hours after he had conceded the narrow
defeat of his referendum to amend Venezuela's Constitution (and before
Chavez undiplomatically denounced the outcome as a "victoria de mierda"
for his opposition). As Castro reaches the twilight of his lengthy
career as the Caesar of Latin American revolution, he is clearly
invested in Chavez's effort to assume that mantle in the near future.
"We discovered an educated, intelligent man, very progressive, an
authentic Bolivarian," as Castro recalls their first meeting in the
mid-1990s. "His adversaries have tried to get him by both force and
economics. But he has faced all the oligarchy's, all of imperialism's
assaults."

Indeed, in Castro's recounting, Cuba played a key role in Chavez's most 
dire challenge: the April 2002 coup attempt, which the Bush
Administration at least tacitly supported. At a critical moment, when
Chavez planned to fight to the finish against the superior military
forces of the coup plotters, Castro urged him not to "sacrifice
yourself" as Salvador Allende had in Chile, but to buy time for his
supporters to rally. After Chavez surrendered, Castro then worked to
mobilize mass opposition to the newly installed government and passed
the message to the general leading the coup that there would be "a
river of blood in Venezuela if this goes on." As the world well knows,
after Chavez was held prisoner for two days, popular protests and his
loyal military officers restored him to his democratically elected post
as president. The rest is a dramatic history that continues to unfold.

Castro tells this previously untold story of his behind-the-scenes
actions during the coup attempt--published here in English for the
first time--in "Fidel Castro: My Life." The book is based on a lengthy
series of interviews conducted by Le Monde diplomatique editor Ignacio
Ramonet and was originally published in Spain. The revised and updated
(by Castro personally) English edition hits bookstores this month. "Few
men have known the glory of entering the pages of both history and
legend while they are still alive," Ramonet writes in the introduction.
"Fidel is one of them." Sidelined from power for health reasons as his
Cuban revolution begins its fiftieth year, this "spoken autobiography"
is likely to be among Castro's final contributions to the histories he
created and the legends he fostered. --Peter Kornbluh

                                    **

An Excerpt from "Fidel Castro: My Life" (A Spoken Autobiography)

Interviews by Ignacio Ramonet

On 11 April 2002 there was a coup in Caracas against Chavez. Were you 
following those events?

...I immediately realized that serious events were about to take
place.... We learned that some high-ranking officers were speaking out
against the president. It was being reported that the presidential
guard had withdrawn and that the army was going to attack Miraflores
[the presidential palace]. Several Venezuelans were calling friends of
theirs in Cuba to say goodbye, because they were ready to resist and
die; they were talking specifically about sacrificing their lives for
their country....

Beginning early that afternoon, I kept trying to phone the Venezuelan 
president. I couldn't get through! After midnight, at 12:38 am on 12 
April, I received news that Chavez was on the line.

I asked him what the situation was at the moment. He replied: 'We're
dug in here in the Palacio [Miraflores]. We've lost the military guard
that would have decided the issue. They've cut off our television feed.
I have no forces to move [as on a chessboard or in battle], but I'm
analysing the situation.' I quickly asked him, 'What forces do you have
there with you?'

'Between 200 and 300 exhausted men.'

'Any tanks?' I asked.

'No. There were some, but they withdrew them back to their base.'

I asked again, 'What other forces do you have?'

And he answered: 'There are some that are far away, but I have no 
communication with them.' He was referring to General Ral Isaias Baduel 
and the paratroopers, the Armoured Division and other forces, but he'd 
lost all communication with those loyal troops.

I tried to be as delicate as possible when I asked him, 'Can I give you
my opinion?' He said I could, so I said with as much persuasion in my
voice as I could muster:

'Lay down the conditions for an honorable agreement and save the life
of the men you have, which are the men who are most loyal to you. Don't 
sacrifice them, or sacrifice yourself.'

He answered emotionally: 'Every man is ready to die here.'

I immediately said back to him, 'I know, but I believe I can think
about this more calmly than you can at the moment. Don't resign, demand 
honorable conditions for surrender, guarantees that you won't be the 
victim of a felony, because I think you should preserve yourself.
Besides, you have a duty to the men with you. Don't sacrifice yourself!'

I was very conscious of the difference between [Salvador] Allende's 
circumstances on 11 September 1973 and Chavez's situation on 12 April 
2002. Allende didn't have [the support of] a single soldier. Chavez had 
most of the soldiers and officers in the army [behind him], especially
the younger ones.

'Don't resign! Don't resign!' I kept telling him.

We talked about other things: the way he should leave the country 
temporarily, get in touch with some officer with real authority among
the ranks of the coup members, assure them of his willingness to leave
the country but not to resign. From Cuba [I told him] we'd try to
mobilise the diplomatic corps in our country and Venezuela; we'd send
two planes with our foreign minister and a group of diplomats to pick
him up. He thought about it for a few seconds, then finally agreed to
my idea. It would all depend now on the enemy military leader....

You were encouraging him to resist with weapon in hand?

No, quite the contrary. That was what Allende did--quite rightly so
under the conditions he was facing--and he heroically paid for it with
his life, as he'd promised.

Chavez had three solutions: barricade himself in Miraflores and resist
to the death; leave the Palacio and try to meet with the people in
order to trigger national resistance, which had virtually no
possibility of success under those circumstances; or leave the country
without resigning, in order to fight another day, which would have a
real chance of rapid success. We suggested the third way.

My final words to convince him were, in essence: 'Save those brave men
who are with you now in that unnecessary battle.' The idea came from my 
conviction that if a popular, charismatic leader such as Chavez,
toppled in that deceitful way and under those circumstances, wasn't
killed, then the people--in this case with the support of the best
members of his armed forces--would demand his return, and that return
would be inevitable....

Did the Cubans at that point try to help Chavez in some way?

Well, at that moment we could only act by deploying the resources of 
diplomacy. In the middle of the night we called together all the 
accredited ambassadors in Havana and suggested that they accompany
Felipe [Perez Roque], our minister of foreign relations, to Caracas to
peacefully rescue Chavez, the legitimate president of Venezuela--get
him out alive....

We proposed to send two planes to bring him back, should the coup
leaders agree to his leaving the country. But the officer at the head
of the coup rejected the formula....

When I called again, two hours later, as he and I had agreed, Chavez
had been taken prisoner by the officers of the coup and all contact
with him had been lost. Television was broadcasting the news of his
'resignation' over and over again, in order to demoralize his
supporters and the rest of the country.

Hours later--it was now broad daylight on 12 April--at one point 
arrangements were made for a telephone call, and Chavez spoke with his 
daughter Maria Gabriela. He told her that he hadn't resigned, that he
was a 'prisoner-president'. He asked her to contact me so I could tell
the world.... I immediately asked her, 'Are you willing to report this
to the world in your own words?' [Castro arranges for Cuban television
to broadcast this information and CNN Spanish transmits it throughout
the hemisphere.]

And what consequences came of that?

Well, it was heard by millions of Venezuelans, mostly opposed to the
coup, and by the soldiers loyal to Chavez, who were being brazenly lied
to about the alleged resignation in order to confuse and paralyse
them....

I then spoke with Lucas Rincun [the inspector general of the Venezuelan 
military]. He told me that the Parachute Brigade, the Armed Division,
and the F-16 base were all against the coup and ready to take action. I 
suggested that he do everything possible to find a solution without 
pitting soldier against soldier....

Minutes later, Maria Gabriela called again; she told me that General 
Baduel, the head of the Parachute Brigade, needed to speak with me, and 
that the loyal forces in Maracay wanted to make a statement to the
people of Venezuela and the world....

'One moment,' he told me. 'I'm going to give the phone to Major General 
Julio Garcia Montoya, permanent secretary of the National Council on 
Security and Defense'.... In essence, he said that the Venezuelan armed 
forces were loyal to the constitution. That said it all....

The situation at that point was excellent. The coup that had begun on
11 April now had not the slightest chance of success. But a sword still
hung by a thread over the country. Chavez's life was in the gravest
danger....

In the desperation I felt as a friend and brother of the imprisoned 
president, a thousand ideas were running through my head...I was about
to call [coup leader] General Vazquez Velasco himself. I'd never spoken
with him, and I had no idea what sort of person he was. I didn't know
whether he'd answer or not, and what he'd do if he did...I had second
thoughts. At 4:15 that afternoon, I called our ambassador in Venezuela,
German Sanchez....

'Call him,' I told Sanchez; 'tell him you're calling on my behalf, on
my orders. Tell him I'm afraid there's going to be a river of blood in 
Venezuela if this goes on. Tell him there's just one man who can keep
that from happening: Hugo Chavez. Urge him to free Chavez immediately,
to forestall that very likely course of events.'

General Vazquez Velasco took the ambassador's call. He said he had
Chavez in his power and that guaranteed his life, but that he couldn't
agree to what we were asking. Our ambassador insisted--he argued, tried
to persuade him. Finally the general got angry and hung up on him.

I immediately called Maria Gabriela and told her what Vazquez Velasco
had said, especially his promise to guarantee Chavez's life. I asked
her to put me in contact with Baduel again. At 4:49 [that afternoon],
the call went through. I told him in detail about our ambassador's
conversation with Vazquez Velasco, and I gave him my view of how
important it was to make Vazquez Velasco aware of the gravity of the
fact that he was holding Chavez. That fact made it possible to exert
maximum pressure on him.

At that moment in Cuba, we didn't know for a certainty whether Chavez
had actually been transferred or not, and if so, where. Hours earlier,
there had been rumours that he'd been sent to the island of Orchila.
When I spoke with Baduel, around 5:00 that afternoon, he was choosing
the men and preparing the helicopters for a rescue. I could imagine how
hard it was for Baduel and the paratroopers to obtain accurate details
for such a delicate mission.

All the rest of that day, until midnight of the 13th, I spent all my
time talking to anyone I could about the subject of Chavez's life. And
I talked to a lot of people, because all that evening, the people, with
the support of army officers and enlisted men, were controlling
everything....

I even called Diosdado Cabello [who served as president for a few hours
at the end of the coup attempt], as soon as he assumed the presidency.
When our phone call was interrupted due to technical problems, I sent
him a message through Hctor Navarro, the minister of higher education,
to suggest that as president he should order Vazquez Velasco to free
Chavez, reminding [Vazquez Velasco] of the seriousness of the
consequences should he refuse to do so.

With almost everyone I spoke, I felt that I was a part of that drama
that Maria Gabriela's phone call had involved me in on the morning of
the 12th....

That's all I know; one day someone else will write the story in all its 
details.